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FOREWORD
David Rudenstine*
Legal academics and law reviews usually focus their attention on
doctrine or legal philosophy, or the interfacing of other disciplines
with either one or both. It is rare that they study and assess the writ
ings of a single Justice of the Supreme Court. Indeed, with few excep
tions, most members of the Supreme Court leave the bench without
ever having their writings reviewed and assessed as a whole. In Octo
ber 1990, however, a group of prominent legal scholars gathered at
the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, under the auspices of the
Jacob Bums Institute for Advanced Legal Studies, to assay Justice
Scalia's jurispmdence, even though he has been a member of the
Court for less than five years.'
The idea of the conference was based on the speculative view that
Scalia's judicial writings are distinctively influential. This seems true
not so much with Scalia's colleagues on the high Court, as it is with
some federal and state court judges. Moreover, Scalia's influence
seems to extend well beyond the judiciary to those who participate in
the pubhc debate on the important issues the Court regularly con
fronts and on the role of the Court itself in our govemmental
stmcture.
Several factors appear to combine to draw attention to Scalia's
writings and to make them influential. Scalia's substantive positions
on issues of public as well as academic interest are controversial, if not
extreme.^ This has not been entirely surprising since Scalia was nomi
nated by President Reagan to the Court as a judicial conservative who
* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law and the Conference Director. I
wish to thank the Jacob Bums Institute for Advanced Legal Studies for the grant that made
the conference possible, and the Cardozo Law Review, especially Robin Flicker, for assuming
the responsibility for coordinating the arrangements for the conference.
• Associate Justice Antonin Scalia was nominated by President Reagan to the United
States Supreme Court on June 17, 1986. N.Y. Times, June 18, 1986, at A8, col. 6. He was
confirmed by the Senate on Wednesday, Sept. 17, 1986 by a vote of 98 to 0. N.Y. Times, Sept.
18, 1986, at Al, cols. 1 & 2. He took his seat on the Court as an Associate Justice on October
6, 1986. N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1986 at Al, col. 3.
2 E.g., Rutan v. Republican Party, 110 S. Ct. 2729, 2746 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't. of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2859 (1990) (Scalia, J., concur
ring); Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3064 (1989) (Scalia, J., concur
ring in part and concurring in judgment); City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,
520 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
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would interpret the Constitution narrowly and seek to undo a genera
tion of Court-created rights.
Scalia would seem to have fulfilled his nominator's hopes. He
would discard the doctrine of substantive due process as unjustified^
and considers prior Supreme Court decisions based on a substantive
due process analysis as illegitimate and deserving of being overruled.
As a result, Scalia favors—almost pleads for—the overruling of Roe v.
Wade, the momentous 1973 decision that provided women with a
constitutionally protected right to an abortion. He unequivocally as
serts that "federal courts have no business" addressing the "difficult,
indeed agonizing, questions that are presented by the constantly in
creasing power of science to keep the human body alive for longer
than any reasonable person would want to inhabit it."^ Scalia has
also urged that political party membership is a constitutionally per
missible consideration in the dispensation of public employment.® As
he emphatically stated: "The choice between patronage and the merit
principle—or, to be more realistic about it, the choice between the
desirable mix of merit and patronage principles in widely varying fed
eral, state, and local political contexts—is not so clear that I would be
prepared, as an original matter, to chisel a single, inflexible prescrip
tion into the Constitution.'" He has argued strongly that the Consti
tution does not permit state and local governments to implement
affirmative action plans unless such plans are "necessary to eliminate
their own maintenance of a system of unlawful racial classification."®
Scalia was the only dissenter in a case in which the majority sustained
a congressional statute creating the independent prosecutor,' which
grew out of the Watergate scandal.
The attention given to Scalia's writings results not just from the
outcomes he reaches, but also from his insistence on originalism as
the most defensible interpretative method for construing the Constitu
tion. Although Professor David Strauss has raised in his paper seri
ous questions as to whether Scalia is a consistent "originalist,'"°
3 See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't. of Health, 110 S. Ct. at 2859-60.
* 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See. e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. at
3064.
3 Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 110 S. Ct. at 2859.
® See Rutan v. Republican Party, 110 S. Ct. at 2746 (Scalia, J., dissentine)
Id. at 2747.
8 City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 524 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in
judgment).
9 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia was also the
only dissenter in Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 413 (1989).
Strauss, Tradition, Precedent, and Justice Scalia, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1699, 1710-11
(1991). See also Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989).
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Scalia, as Professor Burt argued in his article, "emphatically rejects
the proposition that 'interpretation [of the Constitution] must change
from age to age' and that the proper function of the Supreme Court is
'to apply current societal values' in constitutional adjudication."" In
stead, Scalia insists that the original intent of the drafters of the Con
stitution is, as Professor Burt has characterized his views, "the only
legitimate source of constitutional authority."" Scalia acknowledges
the difficulties of reconstructing the intention of the framers, but he
contends that the defects of originalism are preferable to those that
result when a judge invokes fundamental values as the touchstone for
constitutional interpretation."
Although Scalia's outcomes and method are mainly responsible
for the attention his writings currently receive, his superb writing
style also contributes. This not only means that he chooses his words
well and that his sentences propel the reader quickly through the text,
but it also means, as Professor Fried so deftly highlighted during his
Keynote address,'^ that Justice Scalia's writings engage the reader as
though he were thinking out loud (for the reader's benefit) as he de
bated his choice of word and punctuation. Scalia's writings also draw
attention because he does not shrink from being combative, as when
he ridiculed a statement of Justice O'Connor's as one that "cannot be
taken seriously,"" or colorfully maintained that the nine members of
the Court were no more able than "nine people picked at random
from the Kansas City telephone directory" to decide when life be
comes "worthless" or when medical procedures to preserve it become
"inappropriate" or "extraordinary.""
Scalia's notoriety on the high Court seems also due to his willing
ness to go it alone. Fiercely insistent on his positions, he is willing—
perhaps eager—to pen an opinion even though it is not eventually
joined by one of his colleagues. The immediate result of this penchant
is a growing body of opinions to which Scalia has given a strong per
sonal stamp. The long-term consequence of this tendency, however.
1' Burt, Precedent and Authority in Antonin Scalia's Jurisprudence, 12 CARDOZO L. REV.
1685, 1687 (1991).
12 Id..
•3 Scalia, supra note 10, at 863. During his confirmation hearings, Scalia informed the
Senate Judiciary Committee; "I think it is fair to say you would not regard me as someone who
would be likely to use the phrase, living constitution." Hearings before the Committee of the
Judiciary, United States Senate, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess., 48 & 142 (August 5 & 6, 1986).
1^ Regrettably, Professor Fried did not wish to publish his Keynote address.
•5 Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3064 (1989) (Scalia, J., concur
ring in part and concurring in judgment).
16 Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't. of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2859 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
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may be that Scalia runs the risk of "being marginalized," at least as
one academic observer has noted.''
Scalia is prolific and his writings are so voluminous as to chal
lenge any effort to make an overall assessment. As a result, the oneday Cardozo conference was structured on the assumption that less
was more. Instead of trying to canvass all or most of the subjects he
has addressed, only four topics were selected. Two of these—his atti
tude toward precedent and his conception of the good society—were
somewhat open-ended and crisscrossed many fields. The other two—
Scalia's approach to statutory interpretation and the commerce
clause—were more circumscribed. The consequence of narrowing
our focus, I believe, is that the conference participants bore deeper
into their subject than they collectively could have, had we increased
the number of substantive topics to be explored.
i'' The Court's Mr. Right, NEWSWEEK, November 5, 1990, at 62.

